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Machine learning models often encounter distribution shifts when deployed in the real world. In this paper, we focus on adaptation to label distribution shift in the online setting, where the test-time label distribution is continually changing and the model must dynamically adapt to it without observing the true label. Leverag- ing a novel analysis, we show that the lack of true label does not hinder estimation of the expected test loss, which enables the reduction of online label shift adap- tation to conventional online learning. Informed by this observation, we propose adaptation algorithms inspired by classical online learning techniques such as Fol- low The Leader (FTL) and Online Gradient Descent (OGD) and derive their regret bounds. We empirically verify our findings under both simulated and real world label distribution shifts and show that OGD is particularly effective and robust to a variety of challenging label shift scenarios. 

Most computer science conferences rely on paper bidding to assign reviewers to papers. Although paper bidding enables high-quality assignments in days of unprecedented submission numbers, it also opens the door for dishonest reviewers to adversarially influence paper reviewing assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some reviewers bid on papers by “friends” or colluding authors, even though these papers are outside their area of expertise, and recommend them for acceptance without considering the merit of the work. In this paper, we study the efficacy of such bid manipulation attacks and find that, indeed, they can jeopardize the integrity of the review process. We develop a novel approach for paper bidding and assignment that is much more robust against such attacks. We show empirically that our approach provides robustness even when dishonest reviewers collude, have full knowledge of the assignment system’s internal workings, and have access to the system’s inputs. In addition to being more robust, the quality of our paper review assignments is comparable to that of current, non-robust assignment approaches. 

Most computer science conferences rely on paper bidding to assign reviewers to papers. Although paper bidding enables high-quality assignments in days of unprecedented submission numbers, it also opens the door for dishonest reviewers to adversarially influence paper reviewing assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some reviewers bid on papers by "friends" or colluding authors, even though these papers are outside their area of expertise, and recommend them for acceptance without considering the merit of the work. In this paper, we study the efficacy of such bid manipulation attacks and find that, indeed, they can jeopardize the integrity of the review process. We develop a novel approach for paper bidding and assignment that is much more robust against such attacks. We show empirically that our approach provides robustness even when dishonest reviewers collude, have full knowledge of the assignment system’s internal workings, and have access to the system’s inputs. In addition to being more robust, the quality of our paper review assignments is comparable to that of current, non-robust assignment approaches.